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Search ethod Use by Unemployed Youth
ABSTPAC
Inthis paper I investigate the use of different search methods by
unemployed youth. I present a job search model which shows that search method
choices should be related to their costs and expected productivities, as well
as other factorsSuch as nonwage income and wage offer distributions.
I then present empirical evidence on the use of these methods and their
effects on employment outcomes. These results show that the most frequently
used search methods, which are friends and relatives and direct applications
without referral, are also the most productive in generating job offers and
acceptances. Econometric evidence then shows that the number of methods used
is affected by factors which presumably reflect market opportunities as well
as income sources and needs. While the use of specific search methods respond
differently to these factors, they are chosen in a manner which generates
positive average effects on employment outcomes for those who use them. The
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temporary layoff, or tastes for leisure. The notion that particular kinds of
search, such as checking with friends and relatives, may be low in time—
intensity but high in productivity has not been emphasized in the search
literature to date.
There has also been limited empirical work done on the choices and
effects of specific methods of search.Summary evidence has been frequently
provided on search method use and on methods by which recent jobs were
obtained.6 But there have been few attempts to systematically explore the
determinants of search method choices or their different effects on employment
outcomes of individuals.7
This paper is an attempt to extend our understanding of these issues. I
first present a job search model which relates search method choices to their
expected costs and productivities, among other factors.Whether different
search methods are complements or substitutes in the production of job offers
turns out to be an important determinant of these relationships.
I then provide some empirical evidence from a sample of unemployed
youth.8 There are two aims in the empirical analysis:(1) To explore the
factors which cause young unemployed workers to use different methods of
search; and (2) to analyze the effects of these search method choices on
certain outcomes for these job seekers. The use of various search methods is
measured both extensively (i.e., the number of search methods used) and
intensively (i.e., the amount of time spent using each method). The
employment outcomes considered are job offers and acceptances. The data used
in the empirical work are taken from the Youth Cohort of the National
Longitudinal Survey (NLS) for the year 1981.I. Introduction
It is a fundamental fact, long known to labor economists and sociologists
as well as to the lay person, that many people hear about or obtain their jobs
through friends and relatives.' This method is less costly in time and money
than virtually any other, and may be more productive than most in terms of
generating job offers.This higher productivity derives from the fact that
employers seem to regard referrals from their current employees as being more
informative and reliable than direct applications from prospective employees.2
Employees also regard their employed friends and relatives as reliable sources
of information.3 On the other hand, making contact with and applying to firms
directly without such information may be costly and less effective in many
places.The use of state employment agencies has also been known to be of
very limited effectiveness in matching employers andworkers.4
While these stylized facts have long been known to economists, there are
few formal economic models which incorporate them. Saloner (1985) has modeled
the "old boys' network" as a screening mechanism, while Pissarides (1979) and
Barron and Mellow (1982) have focused on state employment agencies in their
work. But more general search models in which individuals choose among a set
of methods with different costs and expected productivities have yet to be
presented.
This issue has particular relevance for models where search effort is
analyzed, since such effort is generally treated as a single uniform
activity.5 The low level of search intensity among the unemployed which has
often been observed in survey data is therefore explained in these models by
various factors such as Unemployment Insurance, the awaiting of recall from4
search effort nnd employment probabilities of various groups are explained as
well. The next section presents the empirical results, while the final
section presents the conclusion.
II. The Model
The theoretical model which is used here to motivate the empirical
analysis is a direct extension of a particular model developed by Burdett
(1980). The model posits that, in each period, unemployed individuals
maximize the sum of current and expected future utility.9The latter is a
weighted average of the utilities derived from working and not working, and
the weights represent the probabilities of being in each of these states.
Individuals maximize their utility by choosing a reservation wage and search
effort. Each unit of search which is undertaken lowers current period utility
of the unemployed because the costs of search in time and money must be
deducted from the individual's nonwage income and leisure time.However,
search is productive in that it raises the probability of receiving an offer,
which raises the expected future utility of being employed.
The major innovation in the version of the model presented here is that
individuals choose from a set of search methods which vary in both cost and
productivity for any given individual.For instance, checking with friends
and relatives for information and "contacts" should be less costly and
possibly more productive than other methods. The costs and productivities can
also vary across individuals for any given search method, according to the
skills, background, and place of residence.Thus individuals who have few
employed friends and relatives or who live far from business areas may find
direct contact with firms more costly and the use of friends and relatives
less productive than will other individuals.3
The major empirical findings can be summarized as follows:
1. The methods of search used most frequently and most intensively by
unemployed youth are checking with friends and relatives and direct
application, respectively. These are also the most productive in
terms of generating job offers and acceptances, conditional on
use. The acceptance rate for offers generated by friends and
relatives is particularly high.
2. The number of search methods used by each individual is positively
affected by one's expected offer probability and by being married
and is negatively affected by being on layoff.These variables
presumably reflect market opportunities as well as income sources
and needs. The determinants of specific search method use are more
varied.
3. Individuals choose search methods so that the number of search
methods used has a positive effect on actual offers received (arid
accepted).Use of specific methods also have positive effects on
offers in most cases.
Overall,search method choices appeartobe based on relative
productivities and costs, as the search model suggests they should be. The
central importance of informal job search methods, especially friends and
relatives, is also underscored here, though extensive use of several search
methods can be beneficial as well.
The rest of the paper is organized into three sections. In the first of
these I present a theoretical job search model that incorporates search
methods which vary in cost arid productivity, for a particular individual and
also across individuals.The implications of such a model for explaining5
More formally, individuals perform the following maximization:







where is the reservation wage; SM1...,SM are the number of times each of
the jsearchmethods is used; U is total expected utility at period t; v is
current period utility, Y is outside income, and L is leisure;c and t are
monetary and time costs per unit of SM; r[ is the offer probability function;
f(w) is the wage offer distribution; and i4.is the utility function for work in
the next period.For the sake of simplicity, it is assumed here thatc and
are constants, though it will be assumed below that each method has
diminishing effects on offer probabilities (i.e., r. > 0 and ii..<0). A
zero discount rate is also assumed throughout for algebraic simplicity, though
results are not affected by this.
The following first—order conditions determine choice of reservation wage
and search method use:
2) (Wr)
3) v1c. +v2t.n. f(ip(w)—
U÷i)f(w)dwfor every j
Equation(2) states that the utility of employment must equal the expected
utility of being unemployed in the next period. Equation (3) states that use
of each search method is chosen to equate its marginal costs (in time and
money) with its marginal benefit, where the latter is the expected gain in6
utility from being employed that each search method provides. Corner
solutions in which search methods are not used because costs exceed benefits
at any level of usage can also occur for any method; if true for all methods,
no search is undertaken. Thus the model determines labor force participation
as well as use of particular search methods.Total search time (ST) and
search costs (SC) undertaken are also determined:
4) ST =tSM. 33 J
5) SC =Ec.SM. 33 J
Total search time and costs thus capture extensive use of search methods as
well as intensive use —i.e.,number of methods used as well as time or cost
spent per method.The choices of search method use and reservation wage




with search methods determining offer probabilities and reservation wages
determining probabilities of offer acceptance.
It should be noted that the model can be extended to allow for search
method effects on the wage offer distribution as well asthe offer
probabilities. This would enable some search methods to result in higher wage
offers than others.In this case, search methods will affect employment
probabilities through job acceptances as well as through offers:7
4
= ll.(1-F(Wr))+_______
whereboth terms would now be positive.11 Search methods would also affect
the expected wage at time of employment in this case.'2
Comparative statics are generated in this model by total differentiation
of Equations (2) and (3).For the sake of simplicity, we consider a two—
factor case below where j =1,2. We also assume constant marginal utility of
income and separability of income and leisure during the current period.
The effect of changes in the costs and the productivity respectively of
search method on its own use are as follows:
dT dT
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where T =r( (w) — f(w)dw.Assuming that the denominator in each
case is positive (on the basis of second—order conditions) the signs of these
derivatives depend on two terms: the cross—method effect on offer
probabilities (i.e., 12 and the effects of each change on the benefits of
future employment (i.e., dT/d).
If the latter were zero, then the signs would be unambiguous:rising
costs of methods would lower own use and rising productivity would raise use,
as intuition suggests they would.However, this would require the strong8
assumption that changes in costs and productivities last only for the current
period. While possibly true in some particular cases (e.g., cyclically
induced changes in offer probabilities or temporarily available positions),
the more relevant considerations involve permanent differences in costs and
productivities across individuals with different backgrounds and
characteristics. Such differences affect T only through their effect on
the expected utility of being unemployed and searching next period.
Given the recursive nature of the model, the magnitudes of the latter effects
cannot be determined. However, it seems safe to assume that rising costs of
search methods will lower expected utility next period, thereby raising
utility of employment (i.e, dU÷1/dc1 < 0, dT/dc1 > 0, dU+i/dti < 0,
dT/dt1 > 0); while rising productivities will have the cositeeffects
(i.e., dU÷i/d1ri > 0, dTIth1 < 0).
Under these more general assumptions, two conditions are sufficient for
there to be negative effects of costs on use of own methods:1)The two
methods are either substitutes or independent in the production of offers
(i.e., 12 0); and 2) The effects of costs on the utility of future
employment are relatively small (i.e., -a.——<—,—-- <—).Likewise,the
1 111 1
effects of productivities on use of own methods are positive when cross—method
effects are the same and when effects on future employment are again fairly
small in absolute value (i.e., dT/dii1 > —Tin1).
The effects of various other factors on search method use can be
similarly determined. For instance, the effects of non—wage income and shifts
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Assuming that the utility of future employment is negatively affected by
outside income (i.e., dT/dy K 0), we obtain unambiguously negative effects of
such income on search method use if the two search methods are either
complements or independent (i.e., 12 0).Likewise, we obtain positive
effects of shifts in the wage distribution in search method use assuming that
the utility of future employment is positively affected by such shifts
(i.e., dT/df(w) > 0) with the same cross—method effects.
The model therefore implies that the use of different search methods may
respond differently to changes in any of these particular factor. The fact
thatsubstitutabiLity of methodsensure5 results insome cases and
complementarity ensures them in others need not be too surprising.The
changes in costs and productivities considered above are method—specific,
while those involving nonwage income and wage offerfare more general. Nethod—
specific changes should have stronger effects when methods are substitutes,
since overall search effort needn't change greatly when use of methods
change. On the other hand, general changes should have stronger effects when
methods are complements, since these changes would then affect these methods
in similar fashions and result in higher or lower search effort overall.
It should also be remembered that, by the assumptions stated above,
higher frequency of use for any search method should lower its ex—post
marginal product in generating offers.This occurs to the point where
marginal products equal marginal costs of use for each method. Thus, lower
cost methods may show higher frequency of use and therefore lower ax—post
marginal (and average) productivity than higher cost referrals; while methods
with higher ex—ante productivity may also show higher frequency and therefore10
comparable ex—post marginal (though still higher average) products relative to
other methods of search. These comparisons are valid across individuals for
the same method of search as well as across methods for the same Individual.
Finally, the dynamics of the model should be noted. As with most optimal
search models, the process will continue from one period to the next until an
acceptable job offer is received.During that time, both reservation wages
and use of search methods may change.In particular, declining flows of
outside income may change use of search methods, while changing expectations
of wage offers may also have effects.If the marginal value of leisure
declines over time, this may provide another reason for search method use to
rise.Therefore, use of search methods should be affected by the prior
duration of unemployment, though the effects of duration are unclear.
III. Empirical Results
The empirical analysis described below is based on data from the Youth
Cohort of the National Longitudial Survey (NLS).This cohort has been
surveyed each year since 1979, and data regarding search behavior are
available in each panel. However, the 1981 panel contains an extensive set of
questions on use of particular search methods as well as their effects. The
analysis below is therefore limited to these data.
The NLS in 1981 contains a list of search methods which often appear in
other surveys, such as the CPS. These methods include "formal" methods, such
as the use of private or state employment agencies, CETA offices, labor
unions, school placement programs, etc.; as well as "informal" methods, such
as checking with friends and relatives, newspapers, schoolteachers or
professors, etc.Applying directly to employers without referral is also
listed as a method of search. Since there are too many methods listed here to11
be studied in detail, the analysis below focuses on the four methods most
frequently used by both white and black youth:friends and relatives,
newspapers, state employment agencies, and direct employer contact without
referral. All other methods are combined below into an additional category.
For every individual who reports having searched for work in the previous
month, the NLS asks whether each specific method has been used during that
time. For those who answer affirmatively on any method, a set of questions is
then asked about the effects of using those methods. In particular, users are
asked whether or not each method resulted in job offers and job acceptances.
Other questions are asked as well for users of each method, such as time spent
using that method and wages on any offer obtained.
The sample used below is limited to nonenrolled and nonenlis ted young
males (age 16 through 23) who were unemployed at the time of search.To
obtain this last group, we include the currently unemployed as well as those
among the the employed who had searched in the previous month and whose
employment durations were 30 days or less.'3
Table 1 presents means on search method use by young blacks and whites.
All means are weighted to account for NLS oversarnpling of low—income whites.
The first row shows that the average number of methods used by unemployed
jobseekers is a bit over three. Thus search does not appear to constitute a
single, uniform activity for those seeking employment.The next five rows
show the proportion of jobseekers who used each method of search.These
extensive measures indicate that the two most frequently used methods of
search are friends and relatives and direct application, respectively.The
higher frequency of use for these methods is consistent with previous evidence
based on census data for youth and older groups (Bradshaw, 1973).
The time spent using each method appears in the next five rows.'4 TheseTable 1
Search Method Used and Time Spent
by Unemployed Youth
Means and Standard Deviations



















Note:These calculations are based on data from the 1981 panel of the NLS,
Youth Cohort. All means are weighted. The sample size for number of
methods used and percentage using each method is 608. For time spent,
sample sizes are: 236 for friends and relatives; 182 for direct
application; 102 for state agencies; 142 for newspapers; and 108 for
other methods. The sample includes nonenrolled and nonenlisted males
who were unemployed and searching in the previous month.12
intensivemeasures of use include only those who used each method and for whom
time spent was not missing. The results show that friends andrelatives, as
well as direct application, are used most intensively as well.Since this
measure reflects time costs per unit of search method as well as frequency of
use per person (Equation (4)); and since these time costs are likely to be
relatively low for use of friends and relatives; we can infer that frequency
of use for this method of search is substantially higher than that forany
other method.
Table 2 presents summary measures of outcomes for the entire sample and
for each search method.These measures include the fraction of users who
obtained job offers and accepted job offers for the entire sample and for
users of each method.
The results show that 34% of the unemployed have received at leastone
offer in the previous month, and that 12% report more than one. The latter
figure may, however, be biased upward by some who report a single offer twice
for different methods of search.'5Almost 28% of the unemployed report
accepting new employment in the previous month. This constitutes about 82% of
allindividuals with offers and about 70%ofall offers made.
The results for each method show that the two methods most likely to
resultin job offers and job acceptances are friends and relatives and direct
application. In fact, these two methods account for about 67% of all reported
offers and 74% of all accepted offers.While it has long been known that a
large fraction of jobs are obtained from "informal search" and especially from
friends and relatives, the results of Tables 1 and 2 establish for the first
time that these high fractions reflect both higher productivity in generating
jobs and higher frequency of use among these methods.16
In fact, the high frequency and intensity of use for friends andTable 2
Outcomes of Search Methods Used
by Unemployed Youth
Percentage of Job Seekers
Who Reported Offers:
One .220
Two or More .120
Percentage Who Reported






Percentage of Job Seekers Who
Reported Job Acceptance:
One .234
Two or More .043
Percentage Who Reported






Note: Samples for those reporting offers and acceptances for each method
include only those who used each one. All means are weighted.13
relatives and for direct application may be at least partly explained by the
high productivity of these methods in producing offer and acceptances, as
predicted by the theoretical model presented above.It should be noted here
that the measures listed in Table 2 reflect ex—post rather than the ex—ante
outcomes needed for testing the theory.However, ex—post outcomes will be
relatively lower for methods with high frequency of use if productivity
dimishes as frequency rises. If this is the case for friends and relativesor
direct application, the ex—ante outcomes for these methods are presumably even
higher and the result of high use for high productivity methods continues to
hold.
The results on friends and relatives are particularly striking, in that
81%of all offers received through this method are accepted —apercentage
well above that of any othermethod listed. Since acceptance or rejection of
offerspresumably is based on a comparison of offered wages with reservation
wages,this finding implies that job offers obtained through friends and
relatives generally have higher wages and/or more appealingnonwage
characteristics than those otherwise obtained. This result is consistent with
evidence showing low rates of quits out of such jobs (Datcher, 1983).17 Also
it further explains the high frequency of use for this method observed above,
as would its apparently low cost of use (in both time and money).
Finally,it is worth noting that differences in search method use between
groups of individuals may also be explained by differences in relative
productivities for these groups across these methods.While black—white
differences in search method use and outcomes are explored elsewhere at
greater length (Holzer, 1986 (b)), it is worth noting here that time spent on
friends and relatives and on direct application is higher for whites while
time spent on other methods is higher for blacks.'8Likewise, the racial14
differences in job offers for users of each method are generally highest for
the first two (i.e., informal) methods (Hoizer, 1986 (b)).Thus, the
prediction of the search model above that productivity of search methods
affect their use appears to be supported by evidence across groups as well as
for the unemployed overall.
We now consider some econometric evidence on the determinants and
outcomes of search method use among unemployed youth. Tables 3 thru 5 present
estimated coefficients from equations of the following general form:
13) S1 =S
(Z1,O)+
14) =0(Xi, Si) +
whereS. is some measure of search method use for the i th individual; 0.
1 — 1
represents an employment outcome which depends on search choices; the X are a
vector of personal characteristics which affect offer probabilities and/or
wage offers; and are other characteristics which affect search choices,
based on Equations 2) arid 3) above. While expected outcomes enter the search
choice equations, these choices themselves enter the ex—post outcome equations
and are considered exogenous.While reservation wage formation is not
explicitly considered among the search choices here, it could be thought of as
a joint product of Equation 13) and an additional determinant of some outcomes
from Equation 14).
In Table 3 consider estimates of Equation 13) in which the dependent
variables are the number of search methods used in the previous month, while
in Table 4 we consider estimates in which the dependent variables are
dichotomous variables for the use of each of the five search methods.2° InTable 3
Equations for Number of Search t1ethods














Note: Predicted offers are based on estimated coefficients that appear in
the Appendix. Duration is measured in hundreds of days.15
both cases, the include a dichotomous variable for marital status, one for
being on layoff, and the duration of the current spell of unemployment. The
predicted outcome variable is the probability of obtaining an offer, estimated
from a first stage equation which included the Z and as independent
variables. The include age, education, race, urban residence, region
(South v non—South), family income, and the local unemployment rate.The
estimated equation upon which this variable is calculated appears in the
Appendix.
The decision to focus on extensive rather than intensive (i.e., time
spent) measures of search method use rested on the large number of missing
values and presumed measurement error (based on memory) of the latter.2'
Offer probabilities are used as the expected outcome because other possible
measures (e.g., acceptance probabilities or offered wages) were less
consistent with the theoretical model presented above or involved some
econometric difficulties.22
As for the Z.,, the variables included here in rio way consititute a
complete specification. Most clearly missing from this group is a variable
for Unemployment Insurance (or other sources of outside income). However, the
UI variables in the NLS Youth Cohort refer to the previous year rather than
month.In these equations the layoff variable provides a rough proxy for
receipt of such funds as well as for the probability of being recalled.In
addition, the marital status variable should capture marginal value of income
(as related to family responsibilities), while duration of unemployment should
capture income stocks or flows (from UI), tastes for leisure, and other
factors.23The duration variable is treated as exogenous here, though some
possible biases are considered below.Because of its high correlation with
the offer probability term (see Appendix), duration and offer probabilities16
appear in separate specifications below. The equations for number of methods
used are estimated using OLS, while those for specific methods are estimated
using Probit.
The results of Table 3 show that there are several factors which
influence the number of search methods used. Expected offer probabilities and
being married have positive effects, while being on layoff has a negative
effect. The last result appears to reflect recall probabilities or receipt of
UI while on layoff and the first two appear to reflect expected returns to
search (and perhaps a higher marginal value of income among the married).
However,these results are all only marginally significant, and the
explanatory power of the equation is quite weak. When duration of
unemployment is included among the independent variables, it has a positive
though insignificant effect on search method use.This, too, is consistent
with declining income and marginal value of time as a spell progresses. It is
also likely that this coefficient represents a lower bound to the true effect
of duration, due to various heterogeneity or selection effects.24
When similar equations are estimated for individual search method use,
the results are somewhat more varied.Table 4 presents these estimates.
Offer probabilities have positive and marginally significant effects on three
methods, and insignificant negative effects on the other two.It is perhaps
not surprising that the latter two effects occur for friends and relatives and
state employment agencies. The low cost of the former enables it to be used
even by those with low expected returns, and the latter is known to be used
primarily by those with few other opportunities. Marital status has effects
which are positive and at least marginally significant for two methods, while
being on layoff has similarly negative effects for two methods.Duration















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































These results therefore suggest that the use of specific search methods
varies across individuals with different opportunities in the labor market and
different sources or needs for income.They are at least broadly consistent
with the model presented above in which search method use is chosen on the
basis of relative productivities and costs which can vary across people.
In Table 5 we turn to the effects of search method use on the production
of offers.These estimates are based on Equation 14), and the dependent
variable is a dichotomous one for whether an offer has been received in the
previous month.Two equations are presented:one in which the number of
methods is used to reflect search method choice, and one in which separate
variables appear for the use of each specific method.Both equations are
estimated using Probit.
The results show that the number of search methods used has a positive
and significant effect on the probability of receiving an offer. Estimated
equations in which the dependent variable was receipt of a job offer and
acceptance showed similar effects.25The results thus stand In marked
contrast to those reported recently by Keeley and Robins (1985) ciho found
negative effects on number of methods used on the probability of gaining
employment. While they attribute the negative effects which they found to the
job search requirements of the UI system, it is very possible that their
results reflect the particular empirical specification which they use to
estimate these effects.26
As for the use of specific search methods, friends and relatives once
again shows the largest positive effect on receipt of offers, while state
agencies and newspapers show effects which are also positive and at least
marginally significant. The effect for state agencies is particularlyTable 5
Equations for Offers Received From
Search Methods Used
1 2













—2 Log L 736.91 733.82
Note: Equations are estimated using Probit.Control variables include:
age, education, region (South v, Non—South), urban residence, race,
family Income, and local unemployment rate.18
noteworthy,given their reputation for low effectiveness.Furthermore, no
method shows a negative effect on receipt of offers.
These results thus show that, while different search methods may have
different effects on employment outcomes, they appear to be chosen in a manner
which generates positive effectS on these outcomes.Methods which generate
fewer offers (such as state agencies) are chosen less frequently and mostly by
those with fewer other opportunities, but even these methods show some
effectiveness for those who use them. Given that there are presumably costs
for the use of each method, the finding of positive average effects on
outcomes is again consistent with a model in which individuals choose methods
which balance the relative productivities and costs of each.
IV.CONCLUSION
In this paper I investigate the use of different search methods by
unemployed youth. I present a job search model which shows that search method
choices should be related to their costs and expected productivities, as well
as other factors such as nonwage income.
I then present empirical evidence on the use of these methods and their
effects on employment outcomes. These results show that the most frequently
used search methods, which are friends and relatives and direct application,
are also the most productive in generating job offers and acceptances. The
acceptance rate for offers generated by friends and relatives is particularly
high.
Econometric evidence then shows that the number of methods used is
affected by factors such as expected offers, marital status, and being on19
layoff which presumably reflect market opportunities as well as income sources
and needs.While the use of specific search methods respond differently to
these factors, they are chosen in a manner which generates positive average
effects on employment outcomes.The results are thus consistent with the
model presented above in which individuals balance relative productivities and
costs across methods when choosing among them.
The fact that search methods are chosen more or less frequently by
different individuals and that these methods have significant effects on
outcomes suggests that they may be an important part of the labor market
process by which individuals are matched with jobs. More research is needed
to further our understanding of this process.In particular, we need to
increase our understanding of why search methods vary in productivity across
individuals who differ in personal characteristics such as race and family
background.Furthermore, we need to understand why the hiring policies of
firms vary in their reliance on employee referrals, direct applications, and
outside institutions. These decisions by firms clearly affect the
productivities of search methods which are exogenously determined for
individuals in the model presented here.Therefore, the analysis of search
method use in general equilibrium search models, as well as more empirical
analysis of both employer and employee search behavior, are clearly warranted.20
FOOTNOTES
1.See Reynolds (1951), Rees and Schultz (1970), and Cranovetter (1974).
For more recent evidence see Corcoran et.al. (1980) and Winship (1982).
2. See Reynolds, op.cit.; also, Heneman et.al (1980), PP. 215—216.
3. See Rees (1966). The greater reliability of Information so obtained and
its implication for reducing employee turnover is stressed in Datcher
(1983).
4. Rees, op.cit.
5 For theoretical models of search effort choice, see Barron and McCafferty
(1977), Barron and Mellow (1979), Seate14979)) and Burdett (1980).For
empirical evidence on search effort choices or effects see Rosenfeld
(1977), Barron and Mellon (1979), Barron and Gluey (1981), Yoon (1981)
and Chirinko (1982).
6.See Bradshaw (1973) for summary evidence on search method use and Winship
op.cit. for evidence on methods by which recent jobs were obtained. Data
on the former are regularly collected and published by the Bureau of
Labor Statistics, whereas those on the latter were based on a special
supplement to the January 1973 CPS.
7.Barron and Gilley op.cit. and Chirinko op.cit. distinguish direct and
indirect search, on "self—directed' and "intermediary" methods. Keeley
and Robins (1985) distinguish "public" from other methods in their
analysis of number of search methods used on employment probabilities.
8.This paper focuses on job search among unemployed youth only. For
empirical evidence which compares job search between employed and
unemployed youth see Holzer (1986ctL21
9.The model is in the tradition of the "partial—partial" job search
literature whereindividualsfaceexogenously determinedoffer
probabilities and wage offer functions which reflect the demand side of
the labor market.The model also focuses on unemployed search only,
though it could be modified to include search among the employed as well
10. Assuming increasing marginal costs rather than constant ones does not
appear to change any of the results of the model.
11. One way of modelling search method effects on wage offers is to assume
that the use of each search method shifts the entire wage offer
distribution by some amount v(SM). The new offer wage distribution then
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13. Those out of the labor are excluded from the sample as well, so as not to
confound search method choices with more general labor force
participation decisions.
14. Hours spent on each method in the previous month are adjusted for those
who have stopped searching to accept new jobs.The adjustment factor
is (30 —D)/30,where D represents duration of current job in days.
15. Though the phrasing of questions imply that search methods are totally
independent in the production of job offers, it is certainly possible22
that more than one of these methods has been used and that the same offer
is reported twice. There is, however, no obvious way of distinguishing
these cases from those in which more than one offer is actually recieved.
16. The question, "How did you obtain your most recent job?" reflects both
frequency of use and productivity in generating offers and acceptances.
For any method j, the probability that a job was obtained through j can
P(E.)
bewritten as p (E.jE) =
p(E)
where P(E) is the probability of having
obtained the job through j and P(E) is the probability of having obtained
any job. The numerator is a product of the probability of using method j
and the conditional probabilities of obtaining offers and accepting them
from using that method.
17. Datcher's interpretation of this result is that friends and relatives
provide better information about non—wage job characteristics and
therefore less quitting on the basis of new information about these
characteristics. An alternative explanation is that the higher wage
relative to reservation wages (which reflect non—wage characteristics of
the job) of these jobs provides less incentive to quit.
13. Time spent on friends and relatives by whites and blacks are 331.8 and
256.4 minutes, respectively.Comparable numbers for the other methods
are: 420.0 and 251.5 for direct applications; 194.4 and 291.3 for state
agencies; 225.0 and 291.5 for newspapers; and 209.2 and 382.2 for all
other methods. Fractions using each method are quite comparable between
the two groups.
19. Reservation wage formation and effects among unemployed youth are
considered in Hoizer (1986 c,d).
20. A preferable specification of these equations might have included for
all five methods simultaneously, since the theory implies that relative23
productivities of all methods are considered when choosing use for each
one.However, attempts to estimate such expected productivities were
hampered by selection problems (since use of each is endogenous), small
sample sizes and wtcclinearity in Equation 13).The effort was
therefore abandoned.
21. Sample sizes for time spent on each method appear in the note for Table
1. Missing values appear for half or more of the users of each method.
22. Acceptance probabilities have the appealing feature of reflecting wage
offers but the problem of reflecting reservation wages as well. First—
stage equations also had much lower explanatory power for this variable,
producing low variance among the predicted variables.Furthermore, the
lower mean of this variable resulted in more predicted values outside of
the 0—1 range, which occurred in very few cases for the offer
probabilities. As for offered wages, these were hampered by small sample
sizes for most of the search methods considered here.
23. Another variable which might have been used to capture marginal value of
income was whether or not an individual lives at home, which was recently
shown to be related to youth employment status (McElroy, 1985).This
variable was highly correlated with marital status, and the latter was
used instead (though results using the former variable were often quite
similar). Other variables which are frequently used to reflect discount
rates among job searchers (e.g., asset values) were not available in the
NLS Youth Cohort.
24. Since duration is presumably negatively correlated with unobserved skill,
and since skill appears to be positively correlated with search method
use, the resulting bias is downward on duration.In particular, when
predicted offers were included along with duration in these equations,24
the coefficients on both rose dramatically (though these results
presumably reflect the high correlation between these variables that is
apparent fromthefirst—stage offer equation intheAppendix.
Furthermore, if shorter spells (due to high search method use) are less
likely to be observed at the time of the survey, this "length bias" will
be downward as well.
25. The estimated coefficient and standard error on number of methods in this
equation was .109 and .048 respectively.
26. Since Keeley and Robins control for intermediate effects (e.g., employer
contacts) in their equations for new employment outcomes, the former may
be picking up the effects of choice variables. The fact that they also
control for UI search requirements in their equations casts doubt on the
claim that the negative effects of search methods can be explained by
these requirements.25
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Note: Family Income variable includes zeroes for missing values and a
dummy variable which equals one in these cases.Family income is
measured in thousands of dollars, while duration is measured in
hundreds of days.